

Intensions, Illuminations, and Toposes

By Christer Hennix (with Henry Flynt)

Draft 3: Aug. 5, 1981

Perception consists not merely in the sensory phantasmagoria but in hidden extrusions and significations which consciousness or thought imminently supplies to the phantasmagoria.* The hidden extrusions or significations supplied to the sensory phantasmagoria by thought or consciousness could also be thought of as impressions or imports or directions. Actually, the best term in colloquial English for such a hidden extrusion, or a signification, would be a "sense"—but my preferred term is intension.

Further, the imminent adducements or injections of these imports or senses may be construed as acts of discernment, identification, or distinction—as acts of collation. Still further, collations and their system or rationale may be considered the subject-matter of a pre-logic.

Our informal equality distinctions form the ultimate source of our apperceptions of the external and inner worlds. The external and inner worlds are not "caused" by material forces out there or biological forces in here, but by seemingly unending chains of identifications and distinctions insisted on by the mind. Anticipating subsequent discussions, we can ask why the mind so insists. Can we change by an act of will an already imprinted (seemingly unending) chain of collations? This is a sensitive question because our entire self-understanding is rooted in informal equality distinctions which we initially adopt naively and with unease, but which persist into seemingly unending time. Therefore, relations of equality are almost at the core of logic. 17

I, Hennix, claim that I am born flawless and complete in myself (at least in that I need no coaching from without). I claim that my original apprehensions—which are encapsulated (self-contained, autonomous, incommunicable)—are consecrated. My self is authentic because it is unformed. Then I am encultured

*Husserl made an entire career out of such observations as this: when I see a "sphere," I in fact see only one hemisphere, and supply the unseen hemisphere through faith as it were. But what characterizes Husserl is that he not only observed that we supply these hidden extrusions to complete the conventional world; he avowed that we are obligated to supply the hidden extrusions which will confirm the conventional world. In other words, Husserl's goal in making the phenomenological analysis was apologetic or conformist.

or socialized. I claim that enculturation is a process of desecration—a process of the imposition of a debasing system of thought-supplied extrusions, imports, etc. This imposition yields ordinary life with its consensus reality. In other words, the "world" which I share with the general public, with other people, is a debased world; and it is debased because other people make it debased. In yet other words, if life were neutral, it would be satisfactory; but other people intervene and make it worse than neutral. My cosmos has no God, but it has a Devil, and the Devil is other people.*

To repeat, why do "we" insist on informal equality distinctions which we irrationally or unwittingly adopt as makeshifts but which are carried over to seemingly unending time? Why do other people demand that I force myself to be something much worse than I originally am? Why am I not allowed to live in a stream of impressions which is free-ranging in the sense of being unobstructed and also uncoerced and undeceived—a process in which my free will decides the steps in the generation of impressions?

If I can return to consecration, then that return must involve intensions able to return me to my pristine apperceptions. (But the best illustration of consecrated apperceptions for the reader is not the apperceptions of infancy but the streaming impressions which I experience when I, Hennix, ingest psychedelics. Exterior resistances are eliminated and I can "stream" without resistances, building impressions like a theme with endless variations.** I accede to a stream of impressions which is free-ranging in the sense of being unobstructed and also uncoerced and undeceived—a process in which my free will decides the steps in the generation of impressions. I feel like saying that "all desire ends" even though there is an overflowing and irresistible desire to go on engaging in novel experiences in which the most complex changes take place within the self.)

A thought-supplied import or sense which counteracts mundane, socially mandated perception and returns me to consecrated apperceptions is called a consecrating intension or an illumination. An illuminatory episode may involve

*What an eccentric cosmos, in which the energy represented by the sentences "counterpart" to me has no role but to debase me! I am invaded by bad vibes, but never by their opposite, and the only way I know the vibes are bad is by comparing them to my pristine self.

**It might be useful for some readers trying to understand the atmosphere of the psychedelic experience to refer to Coleridge's 1797 opium-dream poem, "Kubla Khan."

an identifiable stimulus which evokes my impressions in response. If there is a definite stimulus for the intensional episode, then the stimulus effects a modulation on the subject's inner voices. The quality of the subject's response is correlated to the subject's character.

By an "illuminatory logic" I mean precisely a predictable procedure, a system of intensions, which counteract mundane, socially mandated perception and return me to consecrated apperceptions. As for terminology, however, in the course of my work I have preferred the generic expression intensional logic even though the only such logics of interest to me are those relating to consecrating intensions.

It becomes evident that for my conception, intensions may not be matters of pure instinct or habit, but must be subject to voluntary variation. That is why I asked if we can change by an act of will an already imprinted chain of collations. Then, the system in question is a pre-logic of identifications and distinctions. It has nothing to do with psychology as academically defined. Intensional logic is the rationale or system of the psychedelic experience to me, Hennix.

Because the pristine, consecrated apperceptions are encapsulated, it is an integral part of the intensional logics to devise a nomenclature or encoding of encapsulated apperceptions, thus allowing the discarding of the natural language. Then highs can be read off the code the way I get a high off the defining equation for the first epsilon number.

THEREFORE: IF I ACCEDE TO CONSECRATION—EITHER AS A RETURN, OR AS AN AWAKENING, OR AS A GOING-BEYOND-MYSELF, AN ECSTASIS—THEN THE RATIONALE OR SYSTEM OF THAT ACCESSION WILL BE AN INTENSIONAL LOGIC.

An easily accessible aspect of illumination is acute experiences in which colors of objects become more intense, deep, rich and glowing. Further, visions/apparitions produced by induced states of illumination never resemble mundane objects. They may be extremely definite—yet they are always surrounded by an air of novelty; or, they can constantly approach yet always elude the semblance of commonly known things.

An idea which, like "intension," runs throughout my work is the idea of the realm of consecration or Topos. "Topos" is the Greek word for (proper) place. In mathematics, a Topos is a construction which can serve as a model for all of set theory. Given a family of sets and functions (arrows), a Topos consists of the following. Relative to the arrows, there is an initial object and there is a terminal object. That is, there is a singleton which is only a domain and a singleton which is only a range. There is a sub-object classifier: a means of obtaining substructures from structures (by stating a condition which is fulfilled precisely by the substructure—cf. the Comprehension Axiom in set theory). Finally, the Topos is closed under the power-set operation. In 1976, I explained my concept of Topos by saying that a Topos is like footprints of emptiness, its arrows reducing to the empty event. I compared Topos to the principle of Noh Theater or the Tea Ceremony, or to Nirvana. | ?

The concept of illumination is important for theories of space-time and logics for the experience of the everyday world (the life-world). For instance, consider the concept of time in this context. Time is the medium through which consciousness functions when it organizes two or more perceptions about itself, so that our personas are embodied in a concrete reality bounded by this feeling of time together with perceptions of a background space. One paradigmatic experience of temporality: The real or true self is in a constant tension from attempts to abandon itself in order to become another (an other). (Here we have the injured self, the self which has been deprived by the everyday malice of the ability to collect or compose itself. Recall that I asked why other people demand that I force myself to be something much worse than I originally am.) The antithetical experience of temporality (produced e.g. by psychedelics): Topos has arrived on eddies of illuminations, moving slowly and gracefully—with an exchange of brilliant colors. What is to be stressed in this context is that the illuminatedness of e.g. a perception can dissolve its timely dimensions into a span of loosely connected time-lines some of which even curve back onto themselves. Hence one has the feeling of being suspended rather than moved ahead in time for the duration of the illumination, and hence, also, the feeling that Euclidian geometry ceases to determine the perception of space. (In passing, I would like to mention that these aspects may provide for a revolutionary reinterpretation

of the Clifford-Wheeler geometrodynamics cosmology, in which concrete appearances of matter are conceived of as distortions of empty space by interpreting matter as the result of the curvature of space. Empty space is defined as space with zero curvature.)

Aside: I am in a place from which a voice is heard clamoring "the material universe is a defect in the purity of non-being."

These aspects may also provide for a revelatory reinterpretation of the experience of subjective reality by considering this experience not as a linear ordering but as a complex span of flows of desires coupled with their immediate satisfaction and subsequent evaporation and recomposition enforced by a new radiance and space with illuminatory weight (the space of awareness defined by consecration). Such a flow cannot be distorted by, or even care about, any particular ordering of the past. And any notion of a future world would collapse for it, in view of the (weighted) strength of the illumination sustaining this reality. Therefore, the inevitable timelessness of the flow corresponds to its intensity. And its content is ineffable without even requiring a rarefied atmosphere of attention (it creates such an atmosphere but doesn't require such an atmosphere to initiate it). In this ineffability, interpretations of my intensional logics are (reflexively) self-illuminated. Or a process of self-awareness arrives spontaneously (like love at first sight*) and transforms the mind to a state of complete encapsulation (meaning that the mind is in a state where it touches itself by itself). (This is, essentially, the effect of the revelatory reinterpretation of Montague grammar** which I have documented in Notes on Toposes & Adjoints, Stockholm 1976.) In this context, it is essential to perceive all encapsulated situations as tangential to the sphere of mundane consciousness. Also, it is essential to perceive the tangential space of the subjectively real as being generated by the potential existence of breathings/tunings which are carried by revelatory intensions—such as love at first sight—and as being the space in which the authenticity of the self can experience its own echoes.

*I equate "love" with two people who have mutual cross-identifications, that is, with cross-personal identifications.

**Richard Montague, Formal Philosophy, Yale 1973.

Note: I make special claims for my sound environment, "Electric Harpsicord No. 1," as an intensional stimulus. What is special is that this stimulus evokes --in addition to the aspects already discussed--synesthetic experiences in the consciousness of the perceiving subject. This experience of synesthesia goes beyond the mere association of visual imagery and proceeds to forms of perceptions and experiences which are intermediate between various sense experiences. For example, it is common that the perceiving subject finds himself quite unable to say whether his experience is visual, auditory, or tactile, or even whether he is experiencing a soft touch or smells a rare fragrance. In these emotional states, illumination embraces an overflowing sense of well-being or ecstasis which the subject may describe as the "ending of all desire" despite the overflowing and irresistible desire to go on eternally engaging in novel experiences in which the most complex changes take place within the self. In this way the boundaries normally separating the self from the mundane environment are eroded, and a quasi-psychotic state of consciousness is induced. (Frege: A hitherto unrecognized kind of insanity.) It is to be stressed, however, that these experiences differ only in their superior esthetic qualities and because they correspond to no object in the mundane world: a large part of their charm lies in the halo of beauty which they cast around the simplest and most common objects once their conventionality is removed. It is here (Topos) that the authenticity of the self can experience its own echoes with such intensity that the world and the self coalesce in a state of mutual complete encapsulation.

* * *

(from October 1979)

vaguely Hennix ①

A. The totality is polarized as a self facing a "world." Self is bonded to world by self's noticing whatever world it happens to face and imputing an organization or significance to that world. If this significance-making which bonds self to world is considered from the side of the self, it has the rationale of a system of discernments, identifications, and distinctions—a method of collations.

At some point in infancy, an autonomous inner voice appears. There is a language of inner representations, proceeding by mental signs. Then the infant is socialized or encultured: the world of common sense is thrust upon him, and he is forced to think in one of the natural languages. At this point his inner voice becomes a stream of consciousness in the sense that that phrase has in early twentieth-century fiction.

But since this discourse presupposes an audience and shared language which are mundane, explanations have to proceed in reverse. Instead of explaining mundane language in the autonomous inner voice of the infant, the possibility of an autonomous inner voice has to be explained to mundane consciousness. Thus it is necessary to say that a stream of consciousness can proceed other than through a natural language. The inner voice can be, for example, the free-ranging, endless stream of impressions which follows when I, Hennix, ingest psychedelics.

A given instance of significance-making which bonds self to world would best be called a "sense" in colloquial English but is called an "intension" in my preferred terminology. Again, an intension is structured by a method of collations, and is associated with a language of inner representations proceeding by mental signs.

(I may now give a more technical definition of an intension. The world is everything which is a meaning value. The universe is the class of all worlds. An intension of a creative subject consists of the following: the class of all worlds; a map from the creative subject onto a world. The map involves 1) a method of collations, 2) "bundles" of time-quantum, knowledge-quantum pairs, perceived in a languageless activity.)

A consecrating intension is an insight causing the reinterpretation of a mental sign so that the sign acquires a self-contained (incommunicable), extra-mundane sense. In slightly different words, a consecrating intension is a thought-supplied context for the sensorium which counteracts socially mandated perception and returns the self to autonomous apperceptions. Another term for such an insight is "illumination." An illumination returns the self to the free-ranging, streaming elaboration of impressions of late infancy or early childhood.

It follows that these thoughts are profoundly un-Hegelian, because they imply that at some point in infancy, the self accedes to a "stream of consciousness" which is flawless and complete. Beyond that, the entire indoctrination produced by contact with other people has only injurious, debasing consequences. There is no growth, no elevation produced by engagement with other people—no richer synthesis produced by the self's struggling intake of what other people thrust upon it. Growth comes not from triumphing over adversity, from getting the upper hand against the debasing status quo and transforming it to a higher stage; rather, growth comes from never experiencing adversity or the communal status quo at all. [I, Hennix, am so hurt by other people and feel so helpless in comparison with them that I can only wish they had not been there in the first place.]

*

B. The relationship between the self and its world is initially (before the invasion of a natural language) encapsulated or incommunicable. The meaning of a perception is here no more than the (illuminatory) apperception it offers. Roughly speaking, the relationship between the self and its world becomes public or common when the signs of the inner voice (language of inner representations) start to crumble, and become replaced by the deaf-mute terms of a natural language permeating the mundane world.

I am quite, quite aware of the contradictory structure and dynamics of all objects, relations, and processes in consequence of the determinations projected on them by the words of the natural language. By contrast, the object of illuminatory knowledge is the intrinsic, encapsulated (incommunicable) Being itself rather than the mundane world, the world of dreary phenomena.

The worlds discontinuous with the mundane world contain illuminatory meaning-values and not objects. "All determination (delimitation, specification) is negation." The mundane world and its nature (subjected to scientific "laws") is only the alienation of a being's (person's) authentic spirit. (If the word "being" is used in its meaning of "person," this allows the pun on Being/being.* This pun works better in Heideggerian German as Sein/Dasein.)

I am in a place from which a voice is heard clamoring: The material universe is a defect in the purity of Non-Being.

The growth of human culture is, by and large, the growth of human insensitivity. By objectifying himself in culture, the state, and disgraceful human labor in general, man at the same time alienates himself, becomes other than himself and discovers in this objectification an insurmountable degeneration and barrier which he must, as a philosopher, try to overcome. This is a tension inseparable from mundane existence. Objectification, and with it, alienation, are both, therefore, a matter of mundane necessity.

Consider a consciousness that desires to preserve its innocence and so rejects the impurity of action on the mundane world. What is the lack (!) manifested here? (Authenticity as a lack?!) One thing is clear. The innocent consciousness lacks the persistence to externalize itself. It lacks the power to make itself an autonomous doer in the world and to endure mundane existence without refuge in a false inauthentic consciousness. Given an innocence which is too weak for autonomy, the result of the refusal to be impure must be refusal of communication and flight into an inner silence extinguishing the terms belonging to the natural language--because the projection of determinations on objects, relations, and processes by ordinary words makes for weakness.

[Thus, in the human community, the authentic man (of which I, Hennix, am the prime example) has the guise of a weak man and a deficient man. He can defend himself only by a deliberate helplessness and by sequestering himself, by turning all his relations with other people into pretense and disengaged manipulation.]

*Still other synonyms for "being" are subject and consciousness. But the most accurate synonym is probably "sentience." I used "person" as paraphrase because "sentience" is awkward.—H.F.

The condition of our mundane world is one of invariable tragedy for Being and persons. That is, in our mundane world, the Tragic expresses the invariable state of Being and being. So the critique of the mundane world can only be grounded in a re-examination of the processes by which the totality of human life and expression is reduced to a set of needs defined by the impoverishment of human action: action, generically, is narrowed to work.

*

C. We are witnessing today, as Parmenides did some 2500 years ago, that the language of philosophy is not an authentic means for discriminating between phenomena and noumena. (Noumenon: In Greek, "the apprehended"; for Kant, the intuitively known thing-in-itself, what remains of the object of thought after the categories of the understanding have been stripped from it.) Nor is the traditional notion of logic employed by the philosophers worth our consideration if the goal is to unite persons with persons in order to intensify and elevate their collective and individual lives, sources of Being included.

On the basis of the fragments left by Parmenides, one may ascertain that the inauthenticity of the language of philosophy is one of its birthmarks and that any attempt to save any portion of it is condemned as a frantic, frustration-producing activity (a life-long tantrum in my eyes). Similarly, one may ascertain that the patent sterility of logic in philosophy in no way is peculiar to our epoch but is ingrained in the entire history of philosophy.

Traditionally, Parmenides is counted among the first rational philosophers. But it could well be that it is more appropriate to count him as the last rational philosopher, since philosophy has substantially no more to offer today than 2500 years ago. In fact, in a fundamental respect, contemporary philosophy has substantially less to offer than Parmenides when it comes to pointing out the sources of inauthenticity and sterility which plague the philosopher's common and self-lost language and being.

As a matter of fact, Parmenides rejected the modalities of Aristotelian science well before its installment on the basis that it owes its ontological status to an outmoded way of doing philosophy.

That is to say, Parmenides realized that although (abstract) concepts exist, they owe their existence only as singular ideas in individual minds and are never shared in a substantial way. No two men can be said to know the same thing unless they are aware of the same (mental) inscriptions or voices.

A natural-language proposition (as a physical entity) is a writing or a speaking that signifies some thought or mental proposition, but no one uniquely.

[I would have said: Natural-language sentences do not have unique meanings.--H.F.]

The belief of the realist that he could explain the use of general terms, and so arrive at a general theory of meaning, is typical of the confusion of his enterprise. Because he confounded the realms of thought and Being, the realist supposed that by inventing new words, he discovered new entities which could be used to explain the nature of language and human thinking. But in fact, the correct perception consists in distinguishing the natural language from Being. ... New words have to be explained by using old words and the nature of language can be explained only by employing the natural language. Which is to say that it cannot be explained at all.

According to Parmenides, there is only one sort of referent (denotation), namely whatever is signified by The One. I wish to stress that this means, in particular, that there is, essentially, only one relation of signifying

$\alpha \rightarrow \beta$

that holds between language and its referents, that of an appellative (categorematic) term naming one or more (illuminatory) absolute perceptions. Philosophically significant language rests on a basis of simple concepts and the terms corresponding to them. But a concept, to the extent that it carries signification for a person, is a concept of The One, in the sense that if a man understands at all, he must understand something as a value of the logical operator which asserts existence* (i.e. "there is an ..."), and since only Being must be understood, the object of his understanding must be just the absolute perceptions that are admitted by his ability to take in the whole.

D. Parmenides was the first rational philosopher who explicitly noticed that the natural language only has the capacity to relate Being and reality by processes of all-embracing distortion. The "much contested argument" which the Goddess puts forth** addresses the initial malfunctions of the natural language, the severity of which preclude the natural language as an instrument of rational philosophical inquiry already at the beginning.

*The intensional existence operator, notated \exists . Its values are perceptions of the elevated type.

**The reference is to Parmenides' Lehrschrift, H. Diels (Berlin, 1897).

"It" always signifies Being, i.e. The One that is "ungenerated and imperishable, whole, unique, immovable, and complete." Further, there is a solitary word connected with the signification of Being, namely "exists" or "is." And there is a solitary question (quest) connected with the same word, namely "Is or is not?"

The incompatibility between the way of the philosopher and activities restricted by the natural language has admirably been demonstrated by Zeno, the foremost disciple of Parmenides. As Plato relates in his dialogue "Parmenides," the natural language is insufficient to denote "Many." By a *reductio ad absurdum* and a double-negation elimination, Zeno shows that the natural language, i.e. the language of Plato's dialogues and philosophy, can at most be credited for having the capacity to denote some singular "One." Since Plato wishes and demands to speak about a great many things—by means of the natural language—Zeno has given him an incontestable argument to the effect that his philosophical wishes and demands are ill-advised not to mention their demonstrable lack of rational justification.

Zeno, and previous to him Parmenides, have both conclusively shown (by indirect arguments) that cognitive procedures like illumination are languageless activities in the sense that the natural language is absent from as well as alien to them. Therefore, a natural language cannot be a substrate of the forum for the question of existence-assertion, and neither can the Greek word noein ("knowledge") be compromised or contracted by the only single meaning (if any) afforded by the natural language. Since the route offered by the Goddess is in the direction of the Light, although the journey starts in the House of Night, esti ("being") and noein are terms denoting cognitive experiences achieved on the basis of languageless activities or languages of inner representations, the latter being void of conventional denotations. But having mundane conditions imposed on him, Parmenides cannot sustain his company with the beams of Light radiating from the Goddess' soul. Thus, as an author of the Fragments, Parmenides has been deserted by her powers and is anew wandering astray in the House of Night, relating a past experience which he considers subject to repetition once the mundane conditions for personhood/consciousness have been neutralized (the way of the philosopher). That is to say, what he only asks for is that the natural language is given up in preference to the swiftness of mind's own cognitive momentum and productions of imagery, and last but not least, that silence is respected in case the denoted "One" ceases to exist or never has or never will exist.

* *

E. In the academic tradition of philosophy Parmenides is considered one of the major "difficult" ancient philosophers and the Fragments, in particular, have been held up as inaccessible to a rational analysis. But not only was Parmenides the first rational philosopher on record but he may well have been the last.

The purported difficulties with a rational approach to the Fragments disappear as soon as one realizes that rationality is not an exhaustive attribute of their topic(s) or their author but exclusively of their method. "Existence," "Being," "mind," "What is?": these are the main terms of pre-Socratic philosophy.

Parmenides defined dialectics as the tension between Being and existence, as mediated by philosophical discourse in the natural language. Parmenides was the first philosopher who explicitly noticed that the relations between Being and reality brought about by the medium of the natural language exclusively form all-embracing distortions.

That is to say, the natural language projects a lack of Being, and philosophical discourse entangled with this medium is reduced to the operation of deriving Being from Non-Being, a derivation which can only carry an illusory force.

Parmenides' journey was an iconoclastic transmutation of ordinary human cognition, passing by a certain number of "signposts" (sēmata) but with no particular destination. A mediating, elevating epistemology of languageless activities develops with meaning-values strictly tangential to ordinary language locutions: the values of the distortion factor tending towards zero. For Parmenides, mediating, elevating epistemology is a means for a person/sentience to undo the tension which characterizes dialectics in order to arrive at a tensionless coordination between Being and existence. The manifestations of these tensionless concordances are variously referred to as Toposes, Nirvana, or exact sequences depending on which aspects are emphasized. The way of the philosopher, i.e. the encounter and journey with the Goddess, is an awakening

through love: She devised Eros as the first of all gods (Fragment XIII). So, Parmenides arrived at the following conception of the world:

Reality is the confinement of what is and what is not, the confinement of finiteness and infinity.

"What is" is expressed by \exists .

"What is not" is expressed by \neg .

When reality forms a complete Boolean Algebra, then $\{\exists, \neg\}$ is a complete set of operations for reality (as in mathematics).

Mind's mental operations are:

ATTENTIONS (Arrows, Sets)

COLLATIONS ($=$, \neq)

CONNECTIONS (Con, θ_ω)

MEMORY/RECOLLECTIONS (\mathcal{T}_ω)

PERCEPTIONS (\wedge_ω)

INTENSIONS (\vee_ω)

Mind, upon entering the domain of the galaxy of elevating mediations (Metaxyan Galaxy), is in communion or empathy with Kosmos. Kosmos, or a set with additional structure, stands opposed to Chaos, or a set with no identifiable structure. Kosmos is a "lawlike" object or process: it unfolds in accordance with its fundamental nomos (law) to which all other nomoi are subordinated with distinct ranks of subordination. No such ranking is available for Chaos which behaves as a "lawless" object or process, only noticeable as such, not identifiable. Existence, under the empathy of mind and Kosmos, is expressed by an intensional operator \exists and its image is confined by sentience's tactics of attention and tactics of collation. "Being," "What is?" are the particular values of sentience's mind operations, the values of their images. In general, chains or ladders of mind operations are required in order to obtain or extract the value(s) of a particular (complex) mind object, situated in the galaxy of elevating mediations.

F. Parmenides' encounter with the Goddess must be understood as a fulfillment of his quest for a reality opening to mind and superseding the confinements of mortality and other human conventions, but which nevertheless rests on a rational basis according to which reality comprises the confinements of "what is" and "what is not."

Thus, the encounter does not belong to the category of miracles or lawless objects, but, on the contrary, belongs to the category of a Supreme Being's calculated events or lawlike objects. [It is unclear here whether the reference is to a superior sentience or to the Almighty. In the paraphrase in which Being is Sein and person/sentience is Dasein, the Supreme Being is Sosein, according to Hennix.—H.F.]

But since the encounter is an event which symbolizes a sudden withdrawal from the ordinary human confinements, the Sentience's calculations are not of the ordinary sort.

Ordinary human calculations are, as Brouwer pointed out,* consequent upon the algebraic coherence in the syntax and semantics of the natural language. In contrast, the calculations leading to the encounter and its development--the journey--are performed by a Sentience which has become untouched by the format of ordinary calculations, i.e. a Sentience for whom a new and superior medium of thought is present.

Parmenides seems to be thinking as follows:

To be (peleni or esti) is to complete (teleo) is to turn (+k^uel); i.e. turning is completion. The Goddess puts it in the following terms: It is indifferent to me where I make a beginning for there I come back again (Fragment V).

The journey is a turning away from conventions and a completion of the soul's movements: it is understood that the journey refers to a sudden and violent motion (kineo), or egress.

The concept of egress contrasts sharply with the concept of travelling to a destination (odos). While the "route" takes the traveller to his proper place (tonos), kineo does the opposite: the subject leaves his abode of conventions, overstepping his mortal boundaries.

*L.E.J. Brouwer, "Mathematics, Science, and Language," 1928.

Thus, egress or centrifugal motion is absolute, and so are the egressional calculations by which Parmenides transgresses his mortal boundaries. What Parmenides seems to suggest and demand is an Egressional Logic, i.e. a logic whose calculations take their author into a state of absolute egression and transcendence. This is what Parmenides refers to as Light in contrast to the abode of ordinary human conventions which, by definition, inhabit the Night.

A person's encounter with the Night is essentially his encounter with confused existential quantification, i.e. the simultaneous realization of what is and what is not. A person's use of the natural language only attaches him the more strongly to the elements of Night: it prevents him from reaching out to the Light. However, as the presence of the forces of love increase—as the mindless slaughtering of other minds decreases—the elements of the natural language disintegrate and crumble, and in their place arises Light by egression.

To sum up: Parmenides relates a journey which describes an iconoclastic transmutation of ordinary human cognition. It is an egressional journey, a journey which does not bring the agent of travelling to some specific destination but, rather, does the opposite: as he engages in the journey, the traveller has left his abode of ordinary cognition, he is overstepping its boundaries. The traveller is standing outside himself, he is reaching for ecstasy: he is becoming a superior sentience bathing in Light.

To travel is for Parmenides to move egressionally, kineo. It is an action or activity which presupposes a dislocation, a change of dimensions: the transgression (stepping beyond, iconoclastic transmutation) of a subject abiding at the fringes of Night into a subjectless Sentience sustained by Light. kineo refers here to the simultaneous dislocation of Night and Light and of subject and subjectless Being (esti).

What the Goddess says about the journey or the way of the philosopher is plain: Being is prior to all rational constructions; and to the extent that a language depends on rational actions so does that language qualify as a rational construction to which Being must be prior. It follows that Being as such is not confined or exhaustible by rational actions alone. And, thus, it follows that while rationality may be alien to or absent from a person's actions, Being as such is not alien to rationality but, on the contrary, is its and inalienable foundation.

The egressional flow of mental events which infuses a subjectless Being is confined by the imagery generated by the denotative and non-denotative* signs of a Sentience's solitary language, uttered by his inner voices. And from a subjectless noein ("knowledge") descends a subjectless esti ("being").

Parmenides' cosmological critique is based on the following consideration. The subject is originally born and infused by Night: but its successful quest (dizêsiōs) for a reality opening to mind extinguishes the Night by Light.

The subject is revealed by a name pronounced through the Night, by an infliction on the mind (noêsaí), by a cognition out of phase with the awakened dignity of the philosopher. This disgraceful infliction is the process by which the individual recedes from his original and largely unborn authenticity and becomes a parrot of a general, diffuse murmur of vain human sounds and gestures.

The crucial weakness of Parmenides' argument is the circumstance that the natural language of the Fragments is the language of subjects who are wandering astray (plane), astray because the language does not presuppose or is incapable of denoting subjectless appellative terms which arise during the egressional procedure constituting the realizability of the journey, the movement, the dislocation of consciousness brought about by the successful quest and by the encounter with the Goddess.